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The research beings with a discussion of the legal framework for defense 
reform in 2003 and in 2005 followed by an analysis of the role of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina in implementing the legislation for reform. 
The analysis focuses on efforts to build the capacity of the Parliamentary 
Assembly and asks the question: have the efforts to build the capacity of 
parliamentary oversight of the defense reform implementation been successful in 
increasing democratic control of the Armed Forces of BiH? 
I conclude that yes, the capacity-building efforts have been successful in 
increasing democratic control. However, the Parliamentary Assembly needs to take a 
more critical approach toward the Ministry of Defense and other actors in the politico-
military scene and should use the political tools at its disposal: inquiries, hearings, 
withholding appointments, budget cuts, or legislative deals to ensure proper 
implementation of the defense reform. Only in this way will democratic control 
remain stable despite the gradual pullout of international forces such as the Office of 
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I approached this paper hoping to gain a greater understanding of the military 
reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina and especially the Parliamentary Assembly’s role 
in overseeing that reform process. Part of this process was to gain general knowledge 
of theoretical issues of the role of legislative bodies in overseeing and implementing 
the laws such bodies pass. 
In addition to theory, I also had to gain an understanding of the history of the 
Parliamentary Assembly’s oversight capacity. I chose to focus my observation on the 
Parliamentary Assembly’s role since the Dayton-Paris Peace Accords in 1995 that 
ended the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). 
The document created in Dayton and signed in Paris, the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace, created a new constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
therefore started the parliamentary system on a new path. Not only did the war’s end 
change the nature of the government in BiH, but also the disintegration of the 
Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and BiH’s declaration of 
independence in 1992 gave the country a new direction toward democracy and away 
from communism. 
 With the country’s history in mind, I decided that detailed observation of the 
role of the state legislative body prior to 1995 was not particularly relevant to my 
current research. However, the legacy of communism cannot be ignored, and I have 
referred to that legacy in this work, though my research in that area is only just 
beyond superficial.  
In addition to background on the Parliamentary Assembly since 1995, I also 
researched a detailed background of the military reform since it officially began in 
2003. I first to established a secure background on the reasons for reform, the creation 
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of a strategy for reform, and the status of the reform so far. The status of reform was 
the most difficult to find literature on, as the most recent reform measures began in 
January 2006. Therefore I expect that more information may come out at the end of 
this year or early 2007. However, there is a great amount of information on the reform 
up until the 2005 adjustments to the reform strategy. 
Because of the lack of sufficient literature on the current status of the defense 
reform implementation, I focused special attention in my interviews on this subject. 
My interviews were a key component to my research, and I could not have done this 
research without it. In an effort to get a full picture of the PA’s role in the reform, I 
tried to talk to as many of the players in the defense reform implementation as I could. 
In this way, I hoped to be able to weed out the facts from the political bias. I also tried 
to speak with both internationals and native Bosnians to balance the mix of those 
directly involved in the defense reform. About half of the people I spoke with were 
Bosnian, and the other half from the international community. Those in the 
international community were from Western European nations and the United States. 
For a full list of interviewees, please see the interview list following this paper. 
I had unfortunate timing in this research, because the Parliamentary Assembly 
was not in session for much of my stay due to the October elections. The turnover has 
recently taken place but was delayed during part of my research due to the one party’s 
inability to come to a consensus on the Speaker. Because of the turnover and the 
delay, I was unable to speak with an elected representative in the Parliamentary 
Assembly (PA). However, I did speak with Mr. Željko Grubešić, the PA Expert on 
Defense and Security Matters. Mr. Grubešić works with the PA’s Joint Committee on 
Defense and Security and was able to offer greater insight into the Committee’s 




I came to this research with little background knowledge on the nature of the 
armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina following Dayton or of the efforts to reform 
those forces since 2003. Because my knowledge of military issues was limited, I came 
with few notions about what such reform should look like and why. However, while 
this allowed me a fresh eye, it may also have detracted from my ability to be critical 
of the reforms, and I had little or no basis for such criticism. 
My topical background consisted mostly of an understanding of the 1992-
1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the political structure as it existed following 
Dayton. My political understanding of the country’s recent history, though, allowed 
me to understand the specific challenges facing Bosnia and Herzegovina with which 
many other countries confronting military reform have not had to confront. The 
defense reform in BiH has been and continues to be an extremely sensitive topic, and 
the background I had from living in and studying the region helped me approach my 
research with sensitivity.  
I looked at key international documents that describe the nature of militaries 
and democratic control of defense. I am fully aware that most of these documents, 
though not all, were written and published by Euro-Atlantic organizations, giving me 
a predominantly Western view of military matters. Considering the BiH government’s 
primary motivation for reforming the military – to join NATO’s Partnership-for-
Peace program – a Western view is particularly relevant. However I accept that 
NATO’s requirements and therefore the reform’s Euro-Atlantic approach to reform 
may not be the universal best. I am in no position to make such a judgment and will 
not attempt to in this paper, though I acknowledge that such a debate may be relevant. 
 4 
Recognizing my limitations in having a Western approach, I tried in my 
interviews to get a balance of opinions between Bosnians and internationals. This, of 
course, does not mean that my viewpoint was any less Western, but by weighing both 
sides I gained a fuller understanding of the Bosnian point of view as it related to 
Euro-Atlantic approaches. 
My hope is that I have accurately described here the challenges and successes 






































  Since the end of the Cold War and more recently the terrorist attacks on 11 
September 2001, the nature of security and defense has rapidly changed throughout 
the world. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s security situation was unique and 
especially challenging. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), like most other nations in the 
world has had to confront emerging defense in the twenty-first century. In addition, 
BiH, like other post-socialist states has had to confront the process of transition from 
communism in both military and political scenes. On top of these challenges, which 
are not unique to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country has had to deal with the 
repercussions and domestic military changes resulting from the 1992-1995 war. Those 
involved in the country’s military reform have had the unique challenge of taking on 
post-socialist, post-conflict, and twenty-first century security dilemmas all at once, 
making the reforms both exceptionally difficult and indeed making a successful 
reform that much more remarkable. 
 The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina has created the most complex dimensions 
in this particular reform. The war has been described in many ways: civil war, war of 
secession, war of aggression. In 1992, based on a nationwide referendum, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina declared independence from the shrinking Yugoslavia. Some Bosnian 
Serbs did not want to be independent from Yugoslavia, and Bosnian Serb leaders 
decided that Serb-held territory would secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Because 
most of BiH was multiethnic at the time, territory became a key goal in the war. Full-
scale warfare broke out in 1992 following the referendum and continued until 1995. 
By 1995, the war had seen three sides: the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Muslims also 
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called Bosniacs1, and the Bosnian Croats. Involvement from neighboring states is 
disputed but largely accepted as true. 
 When the war ended, the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina split into two 
entities under one federal government: the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH). While remaining united under a central 
government, the two entities remained fairly separate. Each entity even had it’s own 
military force. 
 Agreements at the Dayton Peace Accords allowed the existence of three 
separate military forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Army of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croat Defense Council Forces, and the Army of 
Republika Srpska. However, before long the Croat Defense Council Forces and the 
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina joined to create the Army of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was controlled by the FBiH entity. 
While technically united, these two armies remained practically separated, and of 
course, the Army of the Federation was still very much separated from the Army of 
Republika Srpska, that is until the recent reforms.  
The defense reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina reflects so many of the 
challenges – and successes – in the country since Dayton: unity, integration, 
democracy, and Euro-Atlantic accession. This particular reform has been an 
especially telling challenge of BiH’s capacity to confront these obstacles, and this 
research looks into the government’s ability and success in approaching such 
challenges. 
The goals of the military reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina were clear from 
the start: Partnership for Peace (PfP) and eventually NATO membership. And one 
                                   
1 See note (d). 
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major condition for PfP membership was democratic civilian control of the armed 
forces. Commonly accepted theory requires that responsibility for democratic control 
lies in parliaments where state-level representation of civilians is highest. 
All players in the reform’s implementation understand the need for 
parliamentary oversight of the military in order to achieve membership in PfP, so the 
question remains: have the efforts to build the capacity of parliamentary oversight of 
the defense reform implementation been successful in increasing democratic control 
of the Armed Forces of BiH? 
The Parliamentary Assembly (PA)2 and its supporters have made great strides 
in legislation, budget control, and on MPs’ knowledge of defense and security 
matters, all three of which are cited by George Katsirdakis, the Deputy Director of the 
Defense Partnership and Cooperative Directorate of NATO’s Sector of Defense 
Planning and Operations, as ways for Parliament to obtain and maintain democratic 
control of armed forces.i 
The implementation of reform is not yet complete, but the successes thus far 
have been recognized and rewarded: at the NATO Riga Summit in November, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, along with Montenegro and Serbia, was invited to become a 
member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace. 
Some of the greatest success has been in the establishment of democratic 
control of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH)3, creating a more 
stable security situation in BiH. However in order to show the government and the 
                                   
2 While the entities’ legislative bodies are often referred to as parliamentary 
assemblies (the Parliamentary Assembly of the Federation of BiH and the 
Parliamentary Assembly of Republika Srpska), when not otherwise specified in this 
paper, Parliamentary Assembly refers to the state Parliamentary Assembly in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The same is true for the abbreviation PA. 
3 The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) refers to the united army 
created by the Defense Reform Commission’s 2005 recommendations and the 2005 
legislation. 
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public in BiH that the parliamentary oversight in BiH has more than an observation 
deck, the Parliamentary Assembly must take action to effect change where change is 
needed in the process of military reform and transition. 
 
This paper will cover the facts and opinions of the defense reform in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. I will cover the background of defense in BiH since the end of the 
1992-1995 war in BiH and the reasons for the defense reform. I will then cover the 
reform itself in its two major phases, the first in 2003 and the second in 2005. I will 
analyze the reforming legislation in both phases with special focus on the politico-
military changes.  
The main analysis will follow the description of reform with a discussion of 
the recent and current efforts to build the capacity of the Parliamentary Assembly in 
BiH to oversee the legislation’s implementation as well as the efficacy of the 
capacity-building efforts. This section also looks at where the Parliamentary 
Assembly can improve in its ability to oversee the military and defense reform, most 
generally in addressing budget issues and on the MPs’ need to be more critical of the 
Ministry of Defense. 
The last section looks toward the future of the defense structure of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, especially in light of BiH’s recent invitation into NATO’s Partnership 










































THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR PEACE 
 
 In 1995 representatives of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the 
Federation of BiH, the Republika Srpska (RS), and other relevant parties signed the 
General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), otherwise known as the Dayton 
Accords or the Dayton-Paris Accords. Among many other elements of GFAP, the 
agreement effectively supported the existence of three separate armies in BiH: “The 
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croat Defense Council Forces, 
and the Army of Republika Srpska,”ii as was often written in the agreement. 
 While GFAP does not specifically address whether military command is under 
entity or state control, it does give more power of safety and security to the Entities 
than to the State. Included in concerns of the State is “international and inter-Entity 
criminal law enforcement, including relations with Interpol.”iii This control of 
criminal law enforcement, referring to what are typically considered police rather than 
military duties, is the only power granted to the State in terms of security. 
 However, the Entities have a broader base for interpretation in their powers of 
security: 
The Entities shall provide a safe and secure environment for all 
persons in their respective jurisdictions, by maintaining civilian law 
enforcement agencies…and by taking such other measures as 
appropriate.iv 
 
Vague as this statement might be, in light of the recognition of three separate armies 
within the State, the security powers of the State being confined to police activity, and 
the ambiguity contained in the Entity’s ability to take “other measures,” the military 
control seems to fall to the Entities. 
 Since GFAP does not specifically state under which government the command 
of the military would lie, the military seems to have ended up lying somewhere 
between state and entity governments or no government at all. However, GFAP did 
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establish a Joint Military Commission, which made a meager stab at providing some 
unity in military discussions and at establishing some level of civilian control. 
 The Joint Military Commission (JMC) was established to “serve as the central 
body for all Parties to this Annex to bring any military complaints, questions, or 
problems that require resolution by the IFOR Commander.”v The JMC was chaired 
and effectively controlled by the IFOR Commander. Sitting on the Commission were, 
among others, the highest ranking military officials from each army as well as two 
civilians selected from each of the three major constituencies.vi These six civilians 
were the only Bosnian4 civilians who had any measure of control of the armed forces 





















                                   
4 ‘Bosnian’ here and in all future references in this paper describes a person who lives 
in or is from the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. ‘Bosniac’ describes a Bosnian who 
considers himself or herself of Muslim descent either religiously or culturally. The 
term ‘Bosniac’ is often used when referring to the three major constituencies in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs. Bosniac can also be spelled 
Bosniak or Bosnjak. 
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TRIGGERS FOR REFORM 
 In July 2001, the Presidency of BiH announced its firm intention to make 
every effort to take all steps necessary to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace program 
(PfP), which is generally accepted to be a first step toward full NATO membership.vii 
It formally expressed a desire to have BiH become a member of PfP, and “the 
Presidency also expressed Bosnia and Herzegovina’s commitment to…the 
implementation of defence reforms including restructuring of the Armed Forces.”viii 
This statement got the government and internationals in BiH thinking about how to 
reform the military.  
However, no significant changes occurred until the discovery in 2002 of 
certain politico-military scandals. One scandal was what is now referred to as the 
ORAO affair. In 2002, it was discovered that the company VZ Orao, based in 
Republika Srpska, had violated a UN Embargo on exporting weapons and other 
military equipment to Iraq.ix 
The other affair was when “SFOR found out that the intelligence services of 
RS were spying on international officials in both Republika Srpska and the 
Federation.”x The result of these two scandals was the resignation of the Serb member 
of the BiH Presidency, Mirko Šarović in April 2003xi and the creation of the Defense 














DEFENSE REFORM COMMISSION 
These scandals pushed defense reform to the top of the agenda. A month after 
Mr. Šaravić’s resignation, the High Representative (HR)5 Paddy Ashdown created the 
Defense Reform Commission (DRC)xii to assess the military and the necessities for its 
reform in BiH. 
Among other duties, the DRC was established to “examine the legal measures 
necessary to reform defense structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, identify 
constitutional and legislative provisions at variance with such requirements and 
propose legislation” that meets the standards and goals to which the reform was 
aimed. Among these goals are: 
a) creating a defense system that meets NATO standards for PfP 
membership; 
b) creating a defense system with “democratic civil oversight of armed 
forces”; 
c) ensuring unified, state-level control of the AFBiH; 
d) ensuring that the size and nature of the military is within the physical and 
financial limits of Bosnia and Herzegovina.xiii 
 
The HR’s mandate gave the DRC the ability to investigate the current status and 
shortfalls of the military in BiH in order to have a full understanding of the 
aforementioned “legal measures necessary” for reform. It also required that the 
reforms move BiH toward greater involvement in Euro-Atlantic organizations such as 
NATO, which was, and still is, the driving force for the BiH government in following 
through with the reform. 
                                   
5 The High Representative is appointed by relevant United Nations Security Council 
resolutions and serves to help the implementation of the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace and to aid the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina (General 
Framework Agreement for Peace, Annex 10, Article 1.2). In a meeting in Bonn, 
Germany, in December 1997, the Peace Implementation Council gave significantly 
greater power to the High Representative. These powers, commonly referred to as the 
Bonn Powers, allows the High Representative to make decisions “to dismiss 
obstructive public officials and impose legislation if BiH’s legislative bodies fail do 
so” (“Key Events Since Dayton”). 
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With the OHR mandate, the Defense Reform Commission set to work, and by 
September 2003 released their suggestions for reform in “The Path to Partnership for 
Peace.”xiv This document laid out legislative suggestions that paved the way for the 
2003 Law on Defense, a law that passed in both houses of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of BiH in December 2003.xv 
 The implementation of reform began with the passage of the 2003 Law on 
Defense, which is discussed in detail below. However, as the June 2004 NATO 
Summit in Istanbul approached, High Representative Ashdown recognized the need 
for more thorough and more rapid military reforms if BiH was to be taken as a serious 
candidate for PfP membership in Istanbul. Therefore, in February 2004, the HR 
extended the DRC’s mandate to include: 
 Supporting the establishment of new institutional structures 
that will create a functioning and modern defence system. This 
includes the full establishment of the Security Committee of the 
Parliamentary Assembly, the adoption of Book of Rules for the State 
Ministry of Defence, the Joint Staff and Operational Command, and 
restructuring of the Entity Ministries of Defense.xvi 
 
This mandate called on the DRC to support the reforms that had already been created 
on paper in the 2003 Law on Defense, not to create new reforms. 
Also included in the extension of the mandate was that the DRC should aid in 
the “timely appointment of personnel” in the new structure, help create the necessary 
budgets, help the Entities in inter-entity cooperation, creation of unified standards, 
and restructuring in light of the reform, and “identifying additional reforms necessary 
to further stabilizing the overall security situation.”xvii This extended mandate 
essentially allows for the drafting of new proposals for reform as well as for the direct 
involvement of the DRC in overseeing the implementation of reform. 
In June 2004 the North Atlantic Council decided at the NATO Summit in 
Istanbul to deny BiH membership into the Partnership for Peace until certain 
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measures were properly fulfilled, including further defense reform measures and 
greater cooperation with the ICTY in arresting indicted war criminals. However, the 
Council did recognize the major steps BiH and other membership-seeking countries 
had taken in reforming the military and therefore created the Tailored Cooperation 
Process (TCP) “as preparation for PfP membership.” The TCP allows BiH to work 
with PfP in selected capacities, but TCP membership is not equal to or even part of 
PfP membership and does not guarantee future membership.xviii 
With confidence behind the start of reform but the acknowledgement that 
more must change, the High Representative again extended the DRC’s mandate in 
December 2004, this time with more specific instructions: 
 The Commission shall examine and propose the legal and 
institutional measures necessary to enhance State level command and 
control, promote cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, …achieve fiscal sustainability, strengthen 
parliamentary over-sight, and promote development of a single 
military force by transferring the competencies of the Entity Ministries 
of Defence to the level of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
implement further the Commission’s recommendations…xix 
 
This second extension of the mandate called on the DRC to be more than just support 
the reform measures already in place. The DRC now was asked to make further 
reforms. The mandate presented the DRC with much specific requests and required 
that they be fulfilled not through helping hands but through new legislative measures. 
So with such a request in hand, the DRC set to work and in September 2005 
submitted its recommendations in the Defense Reform Commission 2005 Report, 
which among other things outlined extensive amendments to the 2003 Law on 































NATO’S PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PROGRAM 
One key motive behind focusing so much of the reform on ensuring that the 
military existed under democratic civilian control was NATO membership, which 
demands democratic control of armed forces. The Law states that all those in the 
military and in the governmental chain of command of the military “shall conduct 
required activities within their respective constitutional and legal authority, with the 
aim of fulfilling the conditions for achieving a membership of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to NATO, by the start of the implementation of this Law.”xx 
The first step to NATO membership is membership in NATO’s Partnership 
for Peace Program (PfP). NATO has stated that in order for states to be invited to be a 
member of PfP, it must have “transparency in national defence planning and 
budgeting; democratic control of defence forces; preparedness for civil disasters and 
other emergencies; and, development of interoperability and co-operation, including 
NATO-led Partnership for Peace operations.”xxi 
 Those working on defense reform recognized these requirements and sought 



















WEAKNESSES UNDER GFAP 
 
 From the implementation of GFAP to the 2003 reforms, the military structure 
in BiH remained essentially untouched, except for changes in the international 
security forces such as the handovers of duties between IFOR, SFOR, and EUFOR. 
When approaching military reform, the first step was to identify weaknesses in the 
system as it existed under GFAP: 
• Inadequate State-level command and control of the Armed Forces; 
• Ambiguities and inconsistencies regarding State and entity 
authorities in defence matters; 
• Insufficient parliamentary oversight and control of the Armed 
Forces; 
• Lack of transparency in defence matters at all levels; 
• Non-compliance with international commitments, particularly 
politico-military aspects of relevant OSCE documents;  
• The size, structure and equipment of the Armed Forces, which were 
not commensurate with real defence and security requirements;  
• Disproportionate funding for defence activities; 
• Deteriorating arms and ammunition stored at an excessive number 
of inappropriate locations; and 
• Poor conditions of service for the full-time and conscript 
components of the Armed Forces.xxii 
 
The main themes in the system’s weakness was that authority over the military was 
unclear and not sufficiently rested in the State; the size of the military and the defense 
budget was far too big, largely because of conscription; and certain politico-military 
dilemmas that kept the military from being a democratic institution in line with Euro-
Atlantic standards.  
To address all such issues, the Defense Reform Commission proposed 









DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES 
The DRC and the 2003 Law on Defense addressed all these points, but the 
most dramatic changes had to come in the democratic control of the armed forces. 
With the two armies answering to different chains of command and no central civilian 
or civilian body controlling both armies, Bosnia and Herzegovina would have no hope 
of becoming a PfP member state. 
But what is democratic control? George Katsirdakis, Deputy Director of the 
Defense Partnership and Co-operative Directorate of NATO, explains democratic 
control and the necessity for it: “In an organized society where we have elected 
members that govern the country, obviously those elected members of the society 
must be able to control the various elements of that society, because they act on behalf 
of the people.”xxiii Democratic principles tell us that society should have its say in 
controlling those institutions that act on society’s behalf. Therefore society should 
have a say in controlling defense and military institutions that are part of society and 
work on behalf of that society’s security. In a democratic structure, this theory 
translates to resting control in democratically elected persons or bodies, including the 
executive and legislative, parliamentary bodies. 
Part of democratic control is the necessity for civilian control, which became 
an important factor in creating a plan for defense reform. Active members of the 
military may have expert knowledge of military matters but are bound by certain 
duties that would prevent them from properly representing constituents, representation 
which, as described above, is a the key reason behind establishing democratic control 




2003 LAW ON DEFENSE 
 
To achieve civilian democratic control, the Law had to clearly define the 
military chain of command and to make sure the highest levels of authority in the 
military were not active-duty military personnel. In other words, for an army to be 
under civilian control, the chain of command must begin within the government, 
rather than with high-ranking military officials.xxiv 
However, it was clear from the start that Bosnia and Herzegovina did not meet 
Euro-Atlantic standards for democratic or civilian control. The DRC’s report stated: 
Effective democratic parliamentary control and oversight of defence in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina…has been lacking in several important 
respects…Several issues related to democratic parliamentary oversight 
must be addressed as Bosnia and Herzegovina prepares its candidacy 
for NATO’s PfP programme.xxv 
 
With these and other shortcomings in the armed forces in BiH in mind and using the 
NATO PfP requirements as a guide, the Defense Reform Commission went to work 
analyzing in detail the state of the armed forces and the changes that should be made 
to bring BiH closer to PfP membership. In September 2003, the Defense Reform 
Commission announced its findings in “The Path to Partnership for Peace,” a 
document identifying the shortcomings of the then-current military structure and 
outlining the plan for its reform. With this information in hand, the BiH Parliamentary 
Assembly compiled and passed the Law on Defense, which passed in the House of 







COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Ministry of Defense 
Primarily, the Law reshaped the command structure and defined the powers therein. 
The Law did not do away with the entity ministries of defense but rather legislated on 
the creation of a state ministry of defense that would have power over the entity 





The Law also described the duties and authority of the commanding civilian 
positions and bodies including the Presidency, the state Ministry and Minster of 
Defense, the Joint Staff, the Operational Command, the Standing Committee on 
Military Matters, the Parliamentary Assembly, and the entity parliaments.xxviii 
 
Command and organizational structure of defense in BiH according to the 
2003 Law on Defense 
 
 BiH Presidency 
BiH Ministry of Defense 
SCMM 
BiH JS Chief F BiH Ministry of Defence 
VF BiH JC Commander 
Federation BiH Army 
Res. component 
F BiH President 
BiH OC 
Commander 
VRS GS Chief 
Army of the 
Republika Srpska 
Res. component 




The creation of the state Ministry of Defense was a great step toward unifying 
the control of the army, which was of course the goal. Before the law passed, the 
highest levels of operational command were the entity ministries of defense, which 
were not legally or practically united. 
However, while the BiH Presidency and the state Ministry of Defense had 
authority over both entity ministries, the entity ministries did retain certain powers: 
“The 2003 Law on Defense defined two chains of command: operational and 
administrative chains of command. The entity ministries of defense were only granted 
responsibilities within the administrative chain of command.”xxix The operational, 




Parliamentary Assembly  
The Parliamentary Assembly should be a major player in democratic control 
as it is a large body of democratically elected officials. The Law gave the PA the 
authority to declare war or a state of emergency, to confirm nominees for positions in 
the military chain of command, to conduct appropriate investigations and make rules 
on the keeping of necessary secrets during such investigations. 
 The PA gained primary control over parliamentary matters regarding the 
AFBiH. The entity parliaments were not exempt from passing legislation regarding 
the AFBiH, but the PA had primary jurisdiction: 
 Article 36: The Parliamentary Assembly shall have primary authority 
to legislate all matters related to the organisation, funding, manning, 
training, equipping, deploying and employing of the Armed Forces of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.xxx 
 
To reiterate, this statement does not exclude participation from entity parliaments. 
Entity parliaments are permitted to legislate on matters of the AFBiH when the PA 
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has not passed legislation one way or another. However, should contradictions in state 
and entity law arise, the state law is the final word, made clear in Article 35: 
The Parliamentary Assembly shall exercise democratic parliamentary 
control over the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and all 
State-level defence institutions.xxxi 
 
This statement is ambiguous because “democratic parliamentary control” can be 
interpreted in any number of ways. However, it is clear here that whatever this 
democratic parliamentary control is, the PA’s control is paramount compared to the 
control of entity parliaments. 
 The purpose of these two articles (35 and 36) is to stress both the primacy of 
state law in military matters and to explicitly define the PA’s role in contributing to 
the command and control of the AFBiH. 
 The Law has the same intentions when it goes on to state the PA’s role in 
overseeing military matters: 
Article 38: The Parliamentary Assembly shall have primary authority 
to oversee and investigate all matters related to the organisation, 
funding, manning, training, equipping, deploying and employing of the 
Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.xxxii 
 
The PA here is granted the “primary authority,” to supervise the running of the 
military and therefore the handling of its reform. However, the Law announces the 
authority to act, not the capacity or will to do so. But for now, let me say simply that 
as written in the 2003 Law on Defense, the PA has the authority, the power, the 
jurisdiction, and most importantly the responsibility to oversee matters related to the 
military. Its capacity to fulfill this responsibility will be addressed in a later section. 
 
Summary 
 So with this Law, the entity armies remained but were partially run by a 
central command that had control over both armies. The entities still participated in 
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administrative tasks (i.e. “funding, organizing, training, manning, and 
equipping”xxxiii), but the final authority rested in the State. State institutions also had 
the authority to command operations, and to initiate and carry out the reform process. 
The state control had some measure of balance between the Presidency and the 
Parliamentary Assembly, as the PA could legislate on and oversee military matters, 
but the Presidency and the Ministry of Defense had the power to enforce the 






































DEFENSE REFORM COMMISSION 2005 REPORT 
 
 As previously described, in response to the High Representative’s December 
2004 extension of the Defense Reform Commission’s mandate, the DRC addressed 
specific issues in the military and in the reform and proposed further legislation to 
adjust the reform process accordingly. 
 The Report was the combined work of all official representatives of the DRC, 
which included the BiH, FBiH, and RS Ministers of Defense, the chair and deputy 
chairs of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly Joint Committee on Security and Defense 
Policy, the Chief of BiH Joint Staff, three high-ranking representatives from NATO 
Headquarters in Sarajevo, the OSCE Director of Security Co-operation, the EU Force 
Commander, the Senior Deputy High Representative (OHR), and a member of the EU 
Presidency. There were also observers from various nationalities and professional 
backgrounds including representatives of certain embassies and from NGOs focused 
on defense and security issues. These observers did not have a vote in the DRC, but 
they could contribute in various other aspects of the Commission’s work.xxxiv 
 Because the 2005 Report posed specific recommendations on legislative 
measures, the chair and deputy chairs of the Parliamentary Assembly’s Joint 
Committee on Defense and Security (herein: Joint Committee)6 were active members 
of the DRC with both a voice and a vote in the Commission’s work. In addition, the 
Joint Committee, which is made up of members of both the House of Representatives 
and the House of People, thoroughly discussed all legislative measures proposed by 
the DRC before the report was released. Mr. Željko Grubešić, the Parliamentary 
                                   
6 The Joint Committee on Defense and Security is not the only parliamentary 
committee that is made of members from both the House of Representatives and the 
House of Peoples (Christian Haupt, interview with the author). However, as the other 
joint committees in the Parliamentary Assembly are not referenced in this work, 
“Joint Committee” will always be used in reference to the Joint Committee on 
Security and Defense. 
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Assembly’s Expert-Advisor for Defense and Security Matters who works closely 
with the Joint Committee, discussed his view of the role of the Joint Committee in the 
work of the DRC in 2005: 
MPs from the Joint Committee supported strongly activity of 
DRC…[The Joint Committee] discuss about defense role and 
legislative role half of year. We discuss about all articles…We make 
the defense law and the service law in correspondence with NATO 
standards…And at the end of 2005, we finish the defense law and the 
service law in our committee. And after that the House of 
Representatives and the House of People concurred all proposal of our 
committee.xxxv 
 
By welcoming the opinions of members of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Defense 
Reform Commission contributed to building the capacity of the Parliamentary 
Assembly to legislate on matters of defense and also made sure that the elected 
officials of the government of BiH had a say in the proposal, making the DRC’s work 
more democratic and ensuring that its recommendations would be taken seriously by 
MPs. And by making the process more democratic and inviting the BiH government 
to take ownership over the reforms, the government was more likely to put its power 
behind implementing such reforms after creating them on paper. 
 
 
LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
 The Defense Reform Commission 2005 Report (herein: the Report) 
recommended sweeping amendments to the 2003 Law on Defense and proposed a 
new law, the Law on Service in the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both 
laws were meant to create a unified system for operations and personnel within the 
AFBiH. The Report also made entity-level legislative recommendations in order to 
adjust entity laws to meet the new structure and especially to address matters in the 
suggested amendments to the 2003 Law on Defense such as the termination of entity 
ministries of defense. 
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Chain of Command 
First and foremost, the 2005 recommendations for amendments to the 2003 
Law on Defense got rid of the entity ministries of defense entirely, making it clear 
that the State of BiH had supreme control over the AFBiH and that there was a united 
command structure. As shown above in Figure 1, the 2003 Law on Defense allowed 
the two armies to stay separate, though the State Ministry of Defense (MoD) had 
authority over both. However, the Entity Ministries of Defense also had authority over 
each army, and while the MoD had control over the entity ministries, political tension 
and confusion was a likely and risky factor. 
Therefore, the new chain of command meant that the entity ministries would 
be closed entirely, and the power those ministries previously enjoyed would go to the 
State Ministry of Defense, which was under the direct command of the Presidency. 
Therefore the Army of the Federation of BiH (VF) and the Army of the Republika 
Srpska (VRS) would be answering to the same people. These changes of course 
would not alone unite the armies, but without this unified chain of command, there 
was little to no hope of uniting the armies themselves, armies that had been answering 
to separate authorities. 
 
Regimental System 
In order to bring the VF and the VRS into one army while still “maintaining 
military heritage and identity,”xxxvi the DRC adopted a regimental system. The 
Commission proposed that there be three regiments representing the three armies that 
had existed in practice (the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Croat Defense Council Forces, and the Army of Republika Srpska). These regiments 
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would be in charge of offering “direction and advice on all issues related to 
ceremonial, custom, heritage and national or historic events. It is critical to understand 
that a regiment has no operational status and does not issue operational orders.”xxxvii 
Regiments would be quite limited in their ability to command troops. 
The regiments’ staff would be fairly small in number, but the battalions would 
be divided according to the regiments to which the soldiers answered. Some battalions 
would answer to the regiment representing the historical Army of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, some battalions to the regiment of the historical Croat 
Defense Council, and some battalions to the regiment of the historical VRS. 
When new recruits complete training and join the AFBiH, they may request to 
which regiment they want to answer. If their top request cannot be granted, they are 
allowed to postpone their joining or choose not to join at all. As the DRC wrote, “no 
individual will ever be forced to join a regiment not of their choice.”xxxviii 
Of course, to reiterate, when a solider or battalion answers to a regiment, the 
regiment is not supposed to be issuing operational commands but rather maintaining 
all things ceremonial. 
While the historical is important, the outcome of the final structure appears 
simply to be a way to allow ethnic divisions to remain even within a so-called unified 
army. The DRC argues that such a situation is important due to the new and changing 
international defense and security landscape: 
The security challenges of the 21st century require highly professional, 
skilled soldiers who can operate in the confusing environment of 
today’s conflicts. This places a premium on unit cohesion and morale. 
For this reason, the Defence Reform Commission supports the 
conversion of the entity armies into three infantry regiments.xxxix 
 
With PfP and eventually NATO membership remaining the major driving force 
behind the reforms, the decision landed on forming an army that could quickly 
 31 
become skilled enough to enter combat alone or in a multi-national campaign. Fully 
integrating these infantry battalions into cohesive and cooperative groups ready for 
modern conflicts and possibly multi-national operations would likely take 
significantly longer than creating the same cooperative groups without full 
integration. Cooperation takes time. Teamwork is easier when the team is made of 
friends. So the DRC went with the regimental system because regiments “provide the 
basis for esprit de corps, morale and unit cohesion by preserving and developing 
military heritage and identity.”xl 
 
Brigade Structure 
 The way the AFBiH would have any semblance of unity would be if these 
battalions that answer to regiments for all things ceremonial answered to a unified 
command for all things operational. For this unified command, the DRC proposed a 
brigade structure similar to that used in most NATO member states. This structure 
would take shape in the AFBiH with three brigades each with three battalions under 
its command. In each brigade, the three battalions would each represent three different 
regimental groups and therefore essentially three nationalities. The brigades would 
answer to the unified, state-level chain of command. Figure 2 reflects the chain of 






are needed to see this picture.
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Parliamentary Assembly 
 The section on the power and responsibilities of the Parliamentary Assembly 
remained largely unchanged from the 2003 Law on Defense. However, the DRC 
recommended that this particular section be moved closer to the beginning of the law 
before the discussion of the roles of other branches of government and high-ranking 
positions in the chain of command. The DRC moved the section in this way “to 
reflect the importance of the constitutional position of the Parliamentary 
Assembly.”xlii 
 
Other Structural Reforms 
 The Report outlines all the specific duties of the positions and offices in the 
chain of command, some of which remained the same as in the 2003 law, some that 
was added or changed, especially in the case of the Ministry of Defense as it absorbed 
all duties of the former entity ministries of defense. For the purposes of this research, 
these changes are not particularly relevant, so I will not describe them in detail here. 
Nor will I go into the other piece of legislation, the Law on Service in the Armed 
Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is included in the Report, because it lacks 
relevance to the research question. 
 The Report includes recommendations on entity-level legislation regarding the 
reform, which deals with various legal adjustments that would need to take effect 
should the aforementioned legislation pass in the Parliamentary Assembly, most 
notably the removal of mentions of and budgets for entity-level ministries of defense.  
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The Report also outlines a general timeline for the transfer of functions and 
the general implementation of these new measures. This timeline begins 1 January 
2006 and ends 31 December 2007. 
 
Professionalization of the AFBiH 
 Aside from structural reforms, the DRC recommended complete 
professionalization of the AFBiH. In the 2003 reforms, the DRC recommended 
significant reductions in the amount of conscripts and in the length of their contracts. 
However, in the 2005 reforms, the DRC suggested the elimination of all conscription: 
The new Law on Defence embraces the concept of professional armed 
forces and the process of professionalisation and 
modernisation…[T]he Defence Reform Commission has agreed to 
eliminate conscription in order to facilitate the development of armed 
forces and defence structures that are truly professional.xliii 
 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have the need for conscription especially after the 
huge push to downsize the military since the reforms began. Nor can BiH afford to 
maintain a conscript army. Therefore, the recommendations and law supported the 
elimination of the conscript system and outlined how to create a professional army. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY VOTES ON THE REFORMS 
 The DRC submitted the Report in September 2005, and in October 2005 both 
the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives that make up the 
Parliamentary Assembly voted on the amendments to the 2003 Law on Defense7 and 
on the Law on Service in the AFBiH. Both laws passed on 5 October 2005.xliv Aside 
                                   
7 The amendments to the 2003 Law on Defense changed more than fifty percent of the 
original law, which according to the Unified Rules for Legislative Drafting in the 
Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2005) requires the creation of a new law. 
Therefore, the amendments to the 2003 Law on Defense dismissed the 2003 law and 
replaced it with the “Law on Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” (DRC 2005 
Report, 41) 
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from a few minor changes that are not relevant to this research, the laws passed 
exactly as they were presented in the Report. The Joint Committee and the PA as a 
whole did spend some time debating the reform legislation, but the MPs’ involvement 
in the DRC and in drafting the legislation within the Report helped speed the process 
along. When voting on the Law on Defense that October, only one member of each 















































 The general agreement in democratic theory is that there exists a need for a 
legislative body to oversee the implementation of the legislation it passes, to hold 
responsible those who are in charge of such implementation. The Euro-Atlantic 
community certainly accepts this theory. The DRC wrote in 2003 that “civilian 
democratic control and oversight of the military is a central organising principle in 
states with methods of governance consistent with Euro-Atlantic practices.”xlvi 
 As discussed above, NATO, which Bosnia and Herzegovina aims to join one 
day, expects that member countries have proper civilian democratic oversight of their 
militaries. George Katsirdakis, the Deputy Director of the Defense Partnership and 
Cooperative Directorate within NATO, spoke of his belief in the importance of 
parliamentary control of armed forces regardless of the supervision or effective 
implementation of laws in other branches of government: 
The parliament has, and should have, one of the most important roles 
in controlling the armed forces. The reason because although the 
President and the government may represent of course elected 
representatives of the state, they do not always represent all the 
tendencies in the political spectrum, which is the case in the case of 
parliament – because parliament is much more representative of the 
people than obviously the government can be. The government 
represents only the leading element of political opinion at a certain 
point in time, but what about the other elements? So that is why 
parliament has such an important role in democratic control.xlvii 
 
What I believe Mr. Katsirdakis was getting at here was that because they are larger 
bodies of government than the executive and have many more members representing 
more concentrated groups of citizens and also are usually up for election more 
frequently than executives, parliaments are more representative of people and 
tendencies in the political sphere. With this in mind, parliaments should have a 
significant amount of control of armed forces to keep that control as representative of 
society’s expectations for the armed forces. 
 Of course, Mr. Katsirdakis left out another key reason for parliamentary control 
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of the armed forces: the parliament should serve as a check on both the active military 
and on the civilians in government who serve in the highest positions in the military 
chain of command, namely the president(s) and the executive-controlled ministry of 
defense. 
 With all this in mind and knowing that NATO expects member states to have 
proper democratic representation as well as a balance of powers in controlling the 
armed forces, leaders in BiH and in the DRC understood that the reform would have 




































PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY’S CAPACITY BEFORE 2003 REFORMS 
 
First we must look at why the Parliamentary Assembly did not have the ability 
to effectively oversee the military. The first reason is the result of a yet incomplete 
process of transition from socialism to democracy. Under the Yugoslav socialist 
system, questioning of military matters was not encouraged and sometimes not even 
tolerated. In addition, the role of a legislative body was minimal; no political tradition 
existed to promote Parliamentary criticism of the executive or the Communist Party. 
The other reason for the Parliamentary Assembly’s lack of sufficient and 
effective oversight was that it did not have complete power in this field but rather 
shared many of the duties of parliamentary control with the entity parliaments, which 
oversaw their own armies. For example, in the Federation of BiH, the entity 
parliament had the authority to act on certain key matters of defense: “Based on the 
Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the entity Parliamentary 
Assembly has two main powers within the sphere of defence: authorising the use of 
military force by the entity and financing the armed forces of the entity.”xlviii 
This lack of power kept the PA from being able to effectively oversee military 
matters as it did not have the power to gain sufficient information on the military or to 
properly react should something go wrong within the military. If a parliament does 
not like what it sees in the matters it supervises, then it should have the power to react 
in a way that effects change. Such powers often come with the authority to hold 
hearings, refuse approval of the executive’s nominees, or withhold requested budgets. 
However, the DRC notes that before the military reform in BiH, the PA had 
“difficulties in securing information or the participation of government officials in 
parliamentary hearings, the lack of effective budget controls and oversight of defence 
expenditures, and underdeveloped relationships between defence institutions and 
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parliamentary committees,”xlix all of which limited its capacity to effect change or 
even to properly observe where change was needed. 
The first most practical capacity gap in the PA was the lack of a committee for 
overseeing military, defense, or security matters. Prior to the release of DRC’s 2003 
report, “The Path to the Partnership for Peace,” committees in the state Parliamentary 
Assembly “recommended the establishment of a Joint Committee for Security Policy 
and Oversight and Control over the Agency for Information and Protection of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina,”l having recognized on their own the need for such a committee. 
The DRC upheld this recommendation, and the PA created the Joint Committee for 
Defense and Security Policy and Monitoring of the Work of Defense and Security 




























CAPACITY-BUILDING IN THE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY 
 
Since the country’s leaders’ almost universal decision to go ahead with 
defense reform in 2003, the Parliamentary Assembly’s capacity to oversee the 
military and its transformation has grown immensely. 
Chilean Senator and President of the Council of the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union, Sergio Páez Verdugo, laid out the general necessities for parliamentary 
oversight of the security sector: 
Parliament is responsible for setting the legal parameters, adopting the 
budget, and overseeing security activities. It can only exercise these 
responsibilities in full if it has broad access to information, the 
necessary technical expertise, and the power and intention to hold the 
government to account.li 
 
We will use these two lists as a starting point for assessing the efficacy of the 
measures the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH has taken to strengthen its capacity to 
successfully implement democratic civilian control of the armed forces. Does the PA 
have broad access to information, technical expertise, and the will to hold the 
government accountable? And with these tools has it set legal parameters, adopted the 
budget, and overseen security activities? 
 
 
TOOLS FOR PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT 
 
Broad Access to Information: 
Ministry of Defense  
 
The Ministry of Defense has proven to be fairly cooperative in sharing 
information with the PA, both through the aforementioned workshops and through 
regular reporting to the Joint Committee on the transition process. Mr. Haupt said, “In 
most cases the Minister of Defense has provided information that was requested [by] 
the Parliament…[But i]n some cases the Ministry of Defense is avoiding to provide 
the answers, or they’re very slow, or the answers are very short.”lii However, the 
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general attitude is that the Ministry is fairly cooperative when the Parliamentary 
Assembly requests information. 
As Mr. Haupt pointed out, some lack of information sharing comes from an 
unwillingness on the side of the Ministry, but some is also the fault of the 
Parliamentary Assembly itself. “There are many events,” said Mr. Haupt, “where we 
[in the international community] would probably…expect the Parliament to run an 
investigation or to ask for more materials, and [the MPs] are not doing it.”liii 
There are a host of reasons why the MPs don’t always request further 
information when they should, but a large factor and one that needs significant 
attention to remedy, is the country’s political tradition. The Communist system of 
which Bosnia and Herzegovina was a part when it was a republic within Yugoslavia, 
did not encourage citizens or government institutions to ask too many questions, 
especially not when it came to military and security matters: “In connection with this 
old bad tradition that with security matters you’re not allowed or you’re not supposed 
to ask questions. This was the past system.”liv And it seems the legacy remains, 
though it is slowly changing. Mr. Haupt for one remains hopeful, saying, “I think 
there is more and more a feeling among Parliamentarians that they are not satisfied 
with implementation, for example with defense reform, and they are willing to take 
this forward now.”lv Having worked closely with the Joint Committee for many years, 
Mr. Haupt is confident that the committee members are now, much more than before, 
willing to question the Minister:  “If you compare now to three years ago when the 
Committee [on Defense and Security] was established, now the members of 







Do not let go unnoticed the amount of cooperation the PA has used in carrying 
out all of these projects, especially its cooperation with the Ministry of Defense. The 
workshops were often coordinated with the MoD, which allows both the PA and the 
MoD to share information and expertise as well as to foster a good and steady 
relationship between the two institutions. 
A handbook written by the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)8 notes the 
importance of parliaments having strong and friendly relationships with other 
institutions: “Not all behaviour and interaction can be regulated by law…[I]nforming 
and involving parliamentarians fully…is not only a matter of transparency and legal 
accountability, but of dialogue between people too.”lvii A cooperative relationship 
between the PA and the MoD is key at this juncture, because synergism will help 
strengthen the capacities of both institutions and therefore strengthen the civilian and 
democratic oversight of the military. Cooperation will also hopefully ensure that the 
MoD respects the requests of the PA in terms of both information sharing and 
recommendations for change. Each institution can learn a lot from the other. 
 
Suggestions 
 As Mr. Haupt mentioned above, the Parliament does not always push the 
Ministry or other institutions for all the information it needs. In the face of resistance 
from other institutions, the PA has proven to back down fairly easily. Therefore, the 
                                   
8 “The IPU is the international organization of Parliaments of sovereign States” 
(www.ipu.org). It serves to connect parliaments throughout the world to coordinate 
and share experiences to improve the workings of parliaments to solve both global 
and domestic issues. 
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MPs need to make sure to ask pertinent questions when receiving reports and must 
also pursue further information where questions remain. Mr. Haupt said: 
What we have to ensure is that [Parliamentarians] build up an 
awareness that they have to scrutinize, that they have to be critical, that 
it is in their interest to be critical and not just to please the Minister [of 
Defense]. So if something goes wrong, they have to ask the difficult 
questions, they have to demand the full implementation…because in 
the end it is to the benefit of the Parliamentarians.lviii 
 
 
In addition, while the PA has been quite successful in ensuring a typically 
friendly relationship with the Ministry of Defense, it should not forget that the 
Ministry need not be the only source of information. The PA should work on creating 
stronger relationships with other government institutions, international and 





One of the greatest obstacles in securing parliamentary oversight of the 
military in BiH is that many MPs lack of sufficient knowledge of military matters, 
especially as they related to politics. Stela Vasić of the Center for Security Studies, a 
Bosnian NGO, said, “You know it’s strange when you come to make a workshop to 
the Parliamentarians and talk about the role of NATO, and they are like completely–– 
asking some silly questions.”lix MPs come from many different backgrounds and 
therefore do not always have a clear understanding of what it means to oversee the 
military or how to do that, how to create a useful budget, or what questions would be 







However, here too Parliament has made great strides in increasing the MPs’ 
politico-military fluency. The MPs on the Joint Committee often attend workshops to 
learn about specific elements of the military and of their duties with regard to military 
matters. For example, Mr. Grubešić described some of the workshops he prepared for 
the MPs: “Every month we have one day for education for MPs. For example, I 
prepared presentation – I cooperate with a representative of MoD – I presented 
structure of Ministry of Defense, of Joint Staff, and I presented activity of MoD.”lx 
The Minister of Defense often attends these workshops to be available for MPs’ 
questions so they may hear the most accurate answers. 
Workshops like these are especially important after elections when new MPs 
begin their work. Therefore this sort of work should be ongoing, and there is every 
indication that it will be, provided funding remains, an issue discussed in full below. 
Educational workshops are not limited, though, to the MPs on the Joint 
Committee. The Center for Security Studies holds workshops to which all MPs are 
invited. It is important that all MPs have at least a basic knowledge of military 
matters, because it is they who will have to debate and vote on relevant legislation 
and appoint certain high-ranking military personnel. Ms. Vasić said that most MPs are 
eager and willing to attend these workshops and to learn what they can about defense 
and security matters. She also praised in particular the Joint Committee’s work in this 
area: “They are very good. We have very good relations with them. Whatever we 
organize, they were helpful.”lxi 
 
Travel 
In addition to the workshops, and actually to strengthen the depth and quality 
of such workshops, some MPs and Parliamentary Assembly staffers such as Mr. 
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Grubešić have been present on various trips to other European parliaments and 
organizations focused on defense and security matters to learn more about 
parliamentary oversight of defense and security: 
We organize cooperation with other countries in Southeast Europe. We 
visited Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Switzerland, Belgium, Slovakia, Lithuania, and we visited Council of 
Europe, Secretariat of OSCE Mission in Vienna, NATO Headquarters 
in Brussels. And also we invited our colleagues from Croatia, from 
Slovenia, from Germany, from France, from Estonia…the main goal of 
this activity was exchanging experience regarding parliamentary 
oversight…and during our visit to all country in the region, we visited 
ministry of defense…and speaker of the parliament.lxii 
 
It is clear that the Joint Committee and the Parliamentary Assembly as a whole are 
working constantly to find the most effective way to oversee the military and to be 
up-to-date on the reforms. 
The Joint Committee’s educational workshops, cooperation with NGOs in 
providing further workshops, and visits to other European nations and organizations 
for security have gone a long way toward providing the MPs with more knowledge of 
the issues, allowing them to be more effective in carrying out their work. 
 
Suggestions 
These activities should continue every year, because education is always an 
ongoing process. Current MPs can build on what they already know, and after every 
election, new MPs will need to catch up. 
My main concern is that many of these extremely helpful and important site 
visits are not funded by the BiH government but by the international community. For 
example, the visits to various European nations as discussed above were funded 
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almost entirely by NATO’s Tailored Cooperation Program (TCP)9 in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.lxiii While outside funding itself is not a significant issue right now, 
problems will arise if and when such funds are withdrawn as the international 
community pulls out of BiH. The PA should look into its own budget to find ways to 
support its projects for oversight, or it should look for ways to secure smaller amounts 
of funding from various donors. It could also explore ways to ensure the repayment of 
loans so that it can securely take out loans to continue to increase its capacity for 
these important activities. 
However, as discussed in full below, the Parliamentary Assembly often cannot 
make necessary budget adjustment due to the tardiness of ministries’ budget 
proposals. Therefore the ministries should take steps to remedy this situation, and the 
international community should put pressure on the ministries to do so. 
If these parties do not take it upon themselves to take action in this case, the 
Parliamentary Committee has a few other options. The first is that if no changes occur 
in the international community’s or the MoD’s actions, the PA should push for an 
inquiry or hearing on the matter or find a menacing political threat to get the 
ministries to produce on-time budgets. This political threat should be the PA’s 
decision to block certain legislation that the government or the particular ministry or 
ministries that have turned in late budget requests want or need passed. Such action 
should not only solve or improve certain budget issues but also prove to the country 
that the Parliamentary Assembly is willing to assert itself to ensure proper 
implementation of the laws.  
                                   
9 The Tailored Cooperation Program (or Process) is a program that allows TCP 
participant countries to take steps toward being involved in the Partnership for Peace. 
Each country’s TCP is different depending on what it can offer to PfP and what PfP 
can offer it. TCP participants are included in some Partnership for Peace activities. 
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The second option is to look for other ways to gain the same or similar 
politico-military fluency on a smaller budget. For example, while some may need 
convincing, international parliamentarians may accept invitations to visit the PA in 
BiH, therefore allowing the same resource-sharing as Bosnian MPs received on visits 
to other European nations but with far fewer expenses.  
While the latter strategy is not ideal, the former being more beneficial to the 
PA and its reputation in the political scene, its relative merits are worth considering, 
especially in a nation where the budget is exceptionally tight, and less-expensive, 
equally-effective alternatives are worth exploring.  
 
Will to Hold the Government Accountable 
This area is trickier to measure, so let us first look at it in reverse. What 
political elements decrease political will, and how have these elements affected the 
PA in BiH? The DCAF and IPO handbook lists the three most common factors in 
decreasing political will: party discipline, constituency interest (or lack thereof), and 
security concerns/confidentiality.lxiv 
 
Decreasing Political Will: 
Party Discipline 
 
Party discipline, the document argues, often makes parliamentarians wary of 
criticizing the executive if (s)he is of the same party.lxv The situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is unique in that there are three presidents that represent the country’s 
three major constituencies. Therefore, the executive branch is always open to a broad 
range of criticism, because every party responds to at least two presidents not of one’s 
own. Therefore, this concern, while not void in BiH, is of lesser importance in 




Constituency interest, which the document interprets as typically society’s 
lack of interest in security matters, means that parliamentarians are less likely to 
pursue issues of security if voters are not interested because “many parliamentarians 
think that it does not pay, in terms of being re-elected, to spend too much of their time 
on security issues.”lxvi Again, this case does not carry much weight in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, because defense and security issues have great relevance to the lives of 
constituents and are often widely discussed in the media. In addition, membership in 
Euro-Atlantic organizations such as NATO does indeed pay off in terms of being re-
elected. Advancement towards membership goals can go along way in re-election 
campaigns, and therefore investing time in security and defense matters should be an 
important consideration in campaign strategy. I have seen no evidence that 





The final factor in decreasing political will is “security considerations forcing 
parliamentarians not to disclose their findings.”lxvii For obvious reasons, information 
on the impact of secrecy is not readily available. However, with the international 
community currently playing a large and active role in the military of BiH, it seems 
that if the PA knows certain secrets, the international intergovernmental organizations 
such as NATO, OSCE, and EUFOR probably do too. Therefore it is not up to the 






 Senator Verdugo did not mention political tradition as a reason for a decrease 
in political will, but it is an especially important aspect in countries of transition, 
especially post-socialist transition. Political tradition in socialist states tends, as it did 
in Yugoslavia, to limit questioning of the Communist Party or the country’s leader. 
Questioning of the Executive, the Communist Party, or the military was not 
encouraged, creating a political tradition that amounts to an unwillingness to hold the 
administration or the military accountable for implementing laws such as the defense 
reform laws in BiH. While this tradition seems to be slowly changing as the country 
adapts to a democratic system, the country’s history in this case still plays a role in 
detracting from political will. 
 
Proving Political Will 
 Having essentially negated the factors that detract from political will, let us 
look at the PA’s actions that reveal its will. First of all, the Joint Committee has 
proven to be one of the strongest committees in Parliament: 
The Defense Security Committee in the State Parliament has a general 
feeling that it is probably the best committee in the State Parliament, 
so…the members are proud to be a member of this committee, which 
automatically results in a more proactive approach.lxviii 
 
The drive in the committee can be seen in all the efforts the MPs and Parliamentary 
staff have made to gain more knowledge of defense issues, namely site visits and 
educational workshops, and to create strong and friendly relationships with other 
institutions. They have cooperated with both international and domestic organizations 
and institutions to create mechanisms for proper oversight, such as the creation of the 
Joint Committee for Defense and Security and the frequent holding of informational 
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meetings and visits with players in the politico-military scene. All this reveals a 
strong will to address security issues and to improve the PA’s ability to do so.   
 
Suggestions 
However, the PA must also be ready and willing to take action to bring about 
change. Of course, with the defense reform’s progress thus far, the PA seems not to 
have many complaints or is unwilling to cause controversy that could undermine the 
progress of reform. Both reasons are logical and worth consideration. But in time, the 
PA will have to prove the reasoning behind its supervision: to hold the government 
accountable. All government institutions have room for improvement, just as the PA 














EFFECTIVE USE OF TOOLS FOR PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT 
With a generally positive assessment of the general tools Senator Verdugo 
listed, we must then look at how the PA has used these tools to properly carry out its 
duties as a legislative body. Let us focus for the purposes of this research on just the 
AFBiH and directly related matters and reforms. In other words, I shall not address 
the PA’s role in internal security matters such as police reform and border security. 
 
Legal Parameters 
 The PA passed two rounds of laws for reforming the structure of the military 
in BiH, first in 2003 and then again in 2005. It created the Joint Committee on 
Security and Defense and through legislation properly addressed its duties with 
respect to the military and the transition process. The Committee oversaw the 
implementation of the 2003 Law on Defense and was quite involved in reviewing and 
adopting DRC’s drafts of the 2005 legislation. The then-Chairman and Deputy 
Chairmen of the Joint Committee served as ex officio members on the Defense 
Reform Commission as it confronted the second round of major reforms in 2005. Dr. 
Raffi Gregorian, the former Co-Chair of the Defense Reform Commission, said that it 
was “very very useful to have them there, because the expectation was that they 
would be our interlocutors in Parliament, to keep them [MPs] informed as to what 
was going on and also give us their expert advice on how to deal with certain issues in 
parliamentary procedure.”lxix 
While the DRC was coming up with a plan for further legislative reforms, 
some MPs visited various defense institutions in BiH to ask personnel what they 
wanted and expected from the reforms. Mr. Grubešić, the PA’s Expert-Advisor for 
Defense and Security, said, “Our MPs discussed with soldiers, with officers, with 
generals. What is their suggestion? What they want…to include in Defense Law and 
 53 
Service Law? And the result was excellent.”lxx This was a true show of a democratic 
system: representatives directly asking constituents about reforms that would have a 
direct impact on these citizens’ lives and jobs. And without the support of these 
members of the military, implementation of reform may have been much more 
problematic.  
After the DRC released its 2005 Report with recommendations on legislative 
changes, the Joint Committee discussed the laws and made a few minor changes 
before overseeing the presentation of the laws to the rest of the Parliamentary 
Assembly for ratification. 
Do not underplay the Committee’s success in this area. The creation of a 
single, unified military was a sensitive topic, and frankly one not required for PfP 
membership, as NATO did not specifically require a fully integrated army. Many 
Bosnians and Parliamentarians alike did not approve of the armies’ unification in this 
way, but the members of the Joint Committee helped push through the reforms. Dr. 
Gregorian, who worked closely with the Joint Committee in getting the 2005 reforms 
passed into law, remarked on the great efforts Committee members put in to creating 
a successful reform package, recognizing “the good will that [MPs] had towards 
trying to make [the 2005 defense reforms] happen even though in some cases 
members of the committee did things and adopted positions that they knew were 
contrary to what their party wanted them to do. A lot of courage demonstrated 
there.”lxxi 
These legislative achievements were no small feat. Reforming any military is 
typically fraught with political danger. The reform in BiH in particular, the idea of 
uniting the two armies, was an extremely sensitive topic. Once deciding to go ahead 
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with the reforms, reaching consensus presented another formidable foe. But the MPs 
rose above the fray and reached nearly unprecedented parliamentary consensus. 
 
Suggestions 
Legislation should not remain forever stagnant. Minor changes could be made 
to make smoother the transition process and the everyday running of the military. Dr. 
Gregorian suggested that the MoD might run more smoothly and be more efficient if 
it had one Deputy Minister instead of two. In addition, the power to remove general 
rank officers rests in the Presidency rather than with the Minister of Defense. The 
Presidency, however, rarely achieves consensus on matters such as this, therefore 
effectively barring the possibility of removing generals from the military who fall 
below standards.lxxii These difficulties might be changed through legislation, and the 
PA should address such issues and look to see if there are other areas in the military 
that would function more efficiently with certain legislative changes. 
However, I recognize that the recent legislative changes regarding military 
matters have been drastic and may need more time to settle before jumping into new 
changes. 
All in all, the legislative achievements in the PA have been extraordinary and 
have gone a long way to helping the country achieve successful reform. Writing 
effective legislation requires a firm understanding of the situation at hand, which can 
be gained through both access to information and expertise, as Senator Verdugo 
suggested.  Passing legislation requires the political will to push for consensus. 
Considering the success of the reform legislation and the overwhelming consensus on 
a highly sensitive and divisive topic, it is clear that the PA effectively used these three 






An accurate and transparent budget is an incredibly arduous and yet important 
task that is left largely to the control of parliaments. As budgets deal mostly (though 
sometimes not solely) with taxpayers’ money, taxpayers have a right to know how the 
money is being spent and therefore deserve a transparent and well-adjusted budget. 
DCAF and the IPU note that “to this day, one of parliament’s most important 
mechanisms for controlling the executive is the budget…As security sector 
organizations use a substantial share of the state’s budget, it remains essential that 
parliament monitor the use of the state’s scarce resources both effectively and 
efficiently.”lxxiii 
Every year the Joint Committee on Security and Defense attends a two-day 
workshop on the defense budget. In cooperation with the Ministry of Defense, the 
workshop leaders “presented [to attendees] structure of the budget elements and what 
is necessary equipment for Army and everything.”lxxiv 
 This effort shows the Committee’s commitment to having a greater 
understanding of the budget and into passing an adequate and yet largely reduced 
budget, noting the major downsizing of the AFBiH throughout the reform process. 
And the Committee’s work has been easier due to the MoD’s accurate and detailed 
budget requests. No doubt the MoD’s cooperation in budget requests comes from the 
mutual respect shared between institutions. Dr. Gregorian said that in “the past two 
years the defense ministry has prepared a very well justified and explained budget. 
It’s the only ministry in the state that does that, that actually follows the guidelines 
that Parliament requires. And as a result the Parliamentary committee has always 




However, in recent years the Parliamentary Assembly as a whole has not 
approved the defense budget requests in full, though often due to extenuating 
circumstances. For example, one year the IMF and the Principal Deputy High 
Representative at the time “ordered the defense budget cut by 75 million marks,”lxxvi a 
decision which, for various reasons, the PA had to respect. This lack of sufficient 
funding will likely slow the transition process and may make the MoD less willing to 
cooperate on budget matters in the future. Therefore it is crucial that the PA address 
these budget cut-backs and that the Joint Committee find ways to push the budget 
through both houses or to fight last minute cutbacks by international community 
leaders. 
The international community of course also has a hand in these cutbacks and 
in these budget issues as they arise. While the IMF surely needs to monitor the BiH 
government’s spending of IMF-loan money, the IMF should try to work with the 
Parliament to come to an agreement on spending. Spending time on these decisions 
will serve both to increase the Parliament’s capacity to properly asses similar budget 
concerns in the future and to uphold democratic principles that the IMF and HR 
infringe upon when making indisputable demands. While the demands may be fully 
within the law in BiH, that fact does not guarantee their democratic values. 
According to Mr. Haupt, in most years the ministries deliver the budgets about 
three months late: in December rather than September. In order to have the year’s 
budget ready on time, the Parliamentary Assembly therefore has only one month 
(until the end of January) to review, adjust, and approve the budget.10 
                                   
10 The respective ministries propose budget requests (i.e. the Ministry of Defense 
proposes the defense budget). The Parliamentary Assembly receives these requests, 
and the relevant committee reviews the budget (i.e. the Committee on Defense and 
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Because of the delay, the Parliament must pass the budget very quickly, 
because a delayed budget approval can have serious repercussions in the country’s 
functioning. However, passing a budget too quickly has consequences of its own: “If 
you want to pass something in a hurry, it means clearly you are not able to look into 
the budget lines and you are not able to change or amend,”lxxvii which, among other 
negative results, leaves both the MoD with what it claims is not enough funding and 
the Parliament which does not have sufficient funds to carry out its duties of 
oversight. 
Mr. Haupt takes issue with the fact that “nobody is in fact asking the question 
whether it’s inappropriate for the government to pass the budget three months late to 
the Parliament, …why [the government is] undermining the right of the Parliament to 
scrutinize the budget and to intervene. But this question is not asked from the side of 
the international community.”lxxviii Therefore, instead of putting all the pressure on the 
Parliament to pass the budget on time, the international community should also make 
a point to pressure the ministries to deliver on-time budget proposals to the 
Parliament. 
Of course, all of these adjustments would certainly be made easier if the 
ministries took it upon themselves to deliver their budget proposals to the PA on time. 
However, the Parliamentary Assembly should not sit idly by waiting for the 
ministries or the international community to change. If no change can be seen, then, 
as mentioned above, the PA should call an inquiry or investigation into the reasons for 
the delayed ministries or should use other political tools at their disposal to pressure 
the ministries into giving MPs what they need to do their jobs properly. 
                                                                                                    
Security reviews the defense budget) and makes adjustments based on the 
committee’s discussion. Once the adjusted budget passes in committee, it goes to a 




Overseeing Security Activities 
As discussed above, the Joint Committee regularly receives reports on the 
MoD’s activities and has a friendly relationship with the MoD. The Minister of 
Defense regularly attends meetings and briefings for the Joint Committee.lxxix 
Committee members have also gone on many site visits to various security 
institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They spoke with members of the Joint Staff, 
with representatives from the MoD and the Minister of Defense himself, with 
soldiers, officers, and generals to gain a better understanding of their work and to see 
where they wanted improvements. The Joint Committee planned many such site visits 
including visits to regional offices of the State Border Service. Mr. Grubešić said, 
“Our committee visited about 65% of the state border. The main goal was: what is 
security at the Bosnian border? And we discuss with border police, with border 
guidance, with management.”lxxx 
Visits such as these are extremely important in developing a close and trusting 
relationship between politicians and military officials. DCAF and the IPU recommend 
that parliamentarians in all countries take part in similar visits of security sector sites: 
Parliamentary visits to the premises of the security services can be 
regarded as a way to develop a dialogue and build trust and 
understanding between political and military leaders. These visits of 
parliamentarians enhance their awareness of the soldiers’ daily 
problems and demonstrate to the military that the political leadership is 
interested in and committed to soldiers’ mission and well-being.”lxxxi 
 
Cooperation is always more efficient and effective than endless bickering, and visits 
such as this are excellent opportunities to build cooperative relationships. 
With huge amounts of information on military matters and with the broad 
scope of defense and security issues and happenings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
 59 
PA will find it impossible to know everything. However, the PA is going to great 
lengths to oversee what it can about defense and security within its borders. 
 
Suggestions 
 We have established that the Parliamentary Assembly’s capacity has 
significantly increased since 2003. Its ability to oversee military matters, to know 
what is going on in the ministry of defense and within the military has seen enormous 
improvement. However, the PA is lacking in its willingness to openly and strongly 
criticize the government or the implementation process. 
 There are several different ways the PA could go about effecting change in 
this scenario including holding a hearing, blocking military appointments, or refusing 
to pass the necessary budget. For various reasons including the need for continuation 
of transition and reform implementation, blockades such as refusing to ratify military 
appointments or pass the budget would not be an effective option for the PA at this 
time. However, a hearing or the threat of one might help to speed the transfer of 
property and secure a stronger position for the PA in military oversight by putting 
power behind its laws and its oversight. The PA can have all the information in the 
world, but if it refuses to effect change based on that information, then it has gotten 
nowhere. DCAF and IPU write of the advantages of a hearing or inquiry: 
With regard to security/defence issues, ad hoc committees of inquiry have a 
specific importance and their advantages are numerous. In particular: [t]heir 
very setting up may be viewed, by the public especially, as a positive political 
signal; [t]hey may be an adequate tool for detailed scrutiny of politically 
sensitive issues related to the security sector; [t]hey may allow a precise 
evaluation of the government’s policy on specific security issues and propose, 
where appropriate, means of redress or reorientation likely to be accepted by 
the entire house and the government.lxxxii 
 
Despite the merits of an inquiry or the like, the PA has not taken appropriate action 
when necessary. When discussing the possibility of an Parliamentary inquiry or 
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investigation into military matters the PA deems inappropriate or not properly 
following the law, Mr. Haupt said, “If it gets tricky, [Parliamentarians] are not 
prepared to go to the very end.”lxxxiii But going to the end, fully pushing the 
government for information and proper implementation practices is exactly the job of 
the Parliament. Mr. Haupt agreed: “Now it’s up to the Parliament to have a critical 
approach and to openly criticize the ministries if something is going wrong…”lxxxiv 
 
Example 
The issue of property is an example of just such a time and place to squeeze 
the government on improper implementation. The most common complaint I have 
heard about the implementation of reforms is with arms control and dealing with the 
exchanging and destruction of movable and immovable property as outlined in the 
body of the 2005 Law on Defense. The details of that process are irrelevant in this 
paper except to say that the 2005 Law on Defense made ambiguous statements 
regarding the transfer of entity-owned military property that is immovable (i.e. land, 
barracks) and movable (i.e. small arms, ammunition). Some argue that the property 
was to be transferred from entity to state ownership in the beginning of January 2006. 
However some entity officials expect the state to pay the entity governments for the 
property, while others in the BiH government disagree because payment is not 
mentioned in the Law. In addition, much of the weaponry was to be destroyed due to 
the military downsizing. As a result of the ambiguity, some in the military and 
government are blocking efforts to transfer or destroy such property.lxxxv 
 The Parliamentary Assembly is not directly responsible for coordinating the 
efforts surrounding the property debate. However, as it is responsible for supervising 
the implementation of the legislation it passed, the PA therefore has responsibility for 
overseeing the transfer and/or destruction of property as written in the law. Since this 
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aspect of the law is not being properly implemented, the Parliamentary Assembly has 
a responsibility to act. 
The lack of cooperation in arms control and property transfer presents an 
opportunity for the Parliamentary Assembly to hold an inquiry and achieve these 
three desired effects: the public’s positive interpretation of the inquiry, the 
opportunity to discuss in public a sensitive issue on all sides, and to address how this 
issue might be resolved. In addition, the international community’s frustration with 
the lack of movement on the property issue would put them in the PA’s corner, giving 
the PA a significant advantage and maybe the resources and power to back up their 
claims of improper implementation. The PA should take full advantage of the 
















SUMMARY OF SUGGESTIONS 
In terms of programming, effort, and the generally agreed-upon success of the 
Parliamentary Assembly’s efforts at building its own capacity to oversee military 
matters, I must conclude that the best way to improve is to continue on the current 
trajectory, to maintain the educational programming and the efforts to get first-hand 
knowledge of the country’s security situation through site visits and the like. 
The PA can improve on its own knowledge of the issues and the ability for it 
to receive accurate and up-to-date information concerning the military if it maintains 
and improves upon its relationships with other institutions in the BiH government as 
well as international and intergovernmental organizations and NGOs. To build on 
these relationships, Parliamentarians and Parliamentary staff should be frequently in 
touch with these organizations, should ask for information, and should continue to 
invite representatives of these organizations to events in the Parliamentary Assembly, 
especially ones outlining the work of the PA. 
The MPs must also take it upon themselves to ask for more information from 
the Ministry of Defense and other defense-related organizations. And they must take 
more critical stances toward the Ministry of Defense, even going so far as establishing 
and following through with an inquiry or parliamentary hearing. 
Budget concerns should be at the forefront of the PA’s criticism. The 
Parliamentary Assembly does not have enough funding to effectively carry out its 
duties of oversight, and some claim the defense budget is insufficient for the 
necessary military duties and reforms. The PA should use its political leverage to 
ensure that budget proposals are delivered on time to allow the PA enough time to 













































While the defense reform in BiH has thus far been quite successful, most 
would say the most successful reform since Dayton, implementation is not yet 
complete, and the future is unclear. 
 
Structure 
The basic structural reforms should hopefully continue to be implemented and 
show signs that they will. The next large hurdle in this scene comes with personnel 
placement. All military personnel have been interviewed in recent months in the 
process of deciding where personnel should be placed based on specialty and 
regimental preferences. By the end of 2006 or beginning of 2007, all offered contracts 
should be delivered, and then it is up to those men and women to decide if they will 
accept the offered positions, though undoubtedly acceptance will for some mean 
geographical changes and maybe serving in a regiment not of one’s preference. Some 
difficulties may arise here, but most seem both hopeful and confident that the process 
will be completed relatively on schedule and without any major delays. And from 
there will begin regular day-to-day business under the new structure. 
At this point, the Parliamentary Assembly should begin regular visits to all 
operational and regimental bases to begin overseeing the military itself rather than 
simply the implementation of legal adjustments, which most commonly translates to 
overseeing the Ministry of Defense. 
 
Partnership for Peace 
 On 29 November 2006, NATO invited Bosnia and Herzegovina to become a 
member of the Partnership for Peace Program.lxxxvi Those I interviewed following the 
decision were largely divided in their ideas about the impact membership will have on 
the implementation of reform, though they all agree that it will have an impact. Some 
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believe the membership will accelerate and improve implementation, because 
politicians are motivated by the decision, having political proof that the reforms have 
been successful so far and that they pay off in terms of reaching the country’s goals 
for Euro-Atlantic integration. Further progress in defense reform could therefore bring 
further integration, which motivates politicians to push ahead. 
 Others, however, are not as confident about the help membership will provide. 
While High Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling celebrated the invitation, 
claiming it is “reward for many years of hard work and a reflection of how far the 
country has come in reforming its defence structures,”lxxxvii some take a different 
stand. Most in Bosnia and Herzegovina agree that the decision was largely political 
and believe that while the defense reform has been successful, the invitation into PfP 
may not have had so much to do with this success as for various political purposes 
such as the upcoming United Nations Security Council decision on the status of the 
region of Kosovo, a sensitive topic in the region. The impact of the Kosovo decision 
deserves much discussion, which I will not offer because of its tangential nature to 
this research. 
 Part of the reasoning behind believing the decision did not have much to do 
with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s actual progress is lack of completion of a key PfP 
requirement: cooperation with the ICTY. While “cooperation” is ambiguous, the 
general agreement was that without explicitly saying so, “cooperation with the ICTY” 
means capturing the two notorious indicted war criminals, Radovan Karadžić and 
Ratko Mladić. These men have not yet been caught, leaving BiH short of the 
necessary requirements for PfP. And yet NATO offered membership, presumably 
then for political reasons only. 
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 While the political nature of the decision is not likely to impede reform, the 
perception that the decision was political could detract from the aforementioned 
political motivation. 
 Regardless of perceptions, though, PfP undoubtedly offers BiH unprecedented 
opportunity. High Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling describes the open 
door offered to BiH through membership: 
The Partnership for Peace is an extremely flexible and innovative 
programme designed to facilitate cooperation with partner countries to 
extend the zone of peace and stability in Europe. It consists of 
practical, bilateral activities between individual partner countries and 
NATO that allow partner countries to develop their own relationship 
with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation. Ultimately, 
therefore, it is what its members make of it.lxxxviii 
 
Hopefully BiH will take advantage of the opportunities to increase Euro-Atlantic 
engagements and to use the specialized nature of the Program to find its own niche in 
NATO in the hopes of future membership. By bringing BiH closer to its goal of 
NATO membership, hopefully politicians will continue to work as hard as they have 



































When inviting Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia to join the 
Partnership for Peace last month, NATO included a signal to the countries that further 
reform and cooperation is still necessary: 
[W]e reaffirm the importance we attach to the values and principles set 
out in the EAPC and PfP basic documents…We will closely monitor 
their respective efforts in this regard.lxxxix 
 
NATO will not let BiH slip into NATO without seeing further improvements. While 
the tasks ahead in order to continue implementation of reform and increase 
cooperation with NATO through PfP and to all other standards for NATO 
membership, challenges also create opportunities, and here Bosnia and Herzegovina 
must take advantage of the opportunity to prove its capacity on the international stage. 
 But how can BiH prove its capacity internationally if its institutions have yet 
to prove it at home? The Parliamentary Assembly in particular has an increasing 
capacity to oversee military matters and to effect change in the country. However, if it 
doesn’t use the capacity it has spent so much time building, then what indeed is the 
point of all that work? 
 The MPs, especially those who sit on the Joint Committee on Defense and 
Security, need to first identify key places where implementation has been blocked or 
slowed such as the transfer of property and the many budget setbacks. Then it needs 
to take a critical stand on these issues and press the government to make the necessary 
adjustments. It can create the necessary pressure through a holding hearing or inquiry, 
blocking appointments, withholding budget requests, or making political deals based 
on legislation the government needs to see passed. 
 The PA has the capacity to take these steps. It has the necessary expertise, the 
backing of relevant laws, and the structure and highly respected reputation of the Joint 
Committee. 
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 One issue now is whether or not it has the political will to follow through with 
its critical measures. With the political success of the reforms now formally backed 
by the international community through the PfP membership invitation, the MPs can 
ride the optimism wave to find the public support it needs, which for a representative 
body is key. 
 The second concern is whether or not the international community will 
support the critical measures. While constantly calling for democratic oversight, the 
IC has not recently proved to offer widespread support for the PA. As one defense 
expert told me regarding the idea of a parliamentary hearing on matters of defense 
reform, the international community does “push for democratic control, [but] there’s a 
limit…The international community probably doesn’t want to be asked certain 
questions.”xc Therefore, the PA will have to assess if such a public display is worth 
the risk of losing some support from the international community both for the 
duration of the hearing and possibly for the future. If the PA believes that risk is not 
worth taking, then it should certainly not back down but rather look toward the other 
suggested avenues of parliamentary power. 
 If the PA can prove that it has power behind its words and is willing to take 
action to effect change rather than sitting by watching while its hard-earned 
legislative reforms disappear in a political pit of implementation, then it will prove to 
the international community, and more importantly to the BiH government and 








I was surprised to find that there was not a noticeable divide between the opinions of 
Bosnians and of members of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
That is not to say all opinions were all the same, but rather that they were not divided 
by citizenship. If nothing else, this aspect proves the teamwork that existed in the 
formation and implementation of defense reform. This was not a case of the 
international community imposing reform on BiH as has been suggested was the case 
with the recent attempts at police reform. Without a doubt, cooperation was a major 
key to the success of defense reform. 
 
However, I was disappointed with the international community’s general attitude of 
“someone else will do it” concerning supporting the capacity building of the 
parliamentary assembly. Often the reasons given for lack of significant engagement 
with the PA was that the institution’s focus was elsewhere, on the practical 
implementation of reforms, for example. 
 
While this reasoning is worth consideration because no organization can do 
everything, I wonder about the reasoning behind these institutions’ priorities. The 
international community as a whole talks so much about democratic control, that it 
seems it would be a top priority. And maybe it is on paper. But democratic control is 
not likely to appear on its own, not even gradually. The IC should take more action to 
help boost the potential of the Parliamentary Assembly, should encourage the PA to 
be more critical, and should support it when it does just that. 
 
The IC should act this way first of all to act like it means what it says, but also to 
improve the independent functioning of the Bosnian governmental institutions. If the 
IC concerns itself solely with the implementation of reform itself, of dealing with 
property issues and whether or not the defense budget can afford a helicopter, then the 
Bosnian government is losing an opportunity to make these decisions on its own. 
When certain international institutions pull out such as the OHR and when the ones 
left quit handholding, what capacity will the Bosnian government have? The new 
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